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LABOR POLICY AND PRIVATE DETERMINATION OF SUCCESSOR
LIABILITY: ILLINOIS' SUCCESSOR CLAUSE STATUTE
The sale of a business that employs a union workforce creates uncer-
tainty as to the buyer's and seller's duties under an unexpired collective
bargaining agreement. Labor unions often attempt to define these duties
by bargaining for a "successor clause" in the agreement. A successor
clause purports to bind a purchaser, who becomes a "successor" em-
ployer, to the terms of the agreement in the event of a transfer of the
business.' The existence of a successor clause raises two questions. First,
should the clause be enforced? Second, against whom should the clause
be enforced-the successor or the predecessor? Answers to these ques-
tions touch on the bases of labor law and public policy. The federal
courts2 and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board)3 have
struggled to define the duties of successor and predecessor employers and
to strike a balance between the often conflicting interests of the employ-
1. Successor language in collective bargaining agreements varies considerably. Commonly,
the language appears in the form of a boiler plate "successors and assigns" clause in the preamble to
the agreement. The preamble may state that "[t]his agreement is made by and between [the com-
pany] its successors and assigns ...." Walker Bros., 41 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 844 (1963) (Crawford,
Arb.). Some successor clauses contain more specific sale or transfer language. For example, "It]he
provisions of this Agreement shall be binding on the company and its successors and assigns and...
shall not be effected or changed in any respect by the consolidation, merger, sale, transfer or assign-
ment of any of the company ...... Wyatt Manu. Co., Inc. 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 53 (1983) (Goodman,
Arb.). Other successor clauses expressly require the employer to condition a sale of the business on
the purchaser's assumption of the collective bargaining agreement: "[tihis agreement shall be bind-
ing on any and all successors and assigns of the Employer .... The Employer shall make it a
condition of transfer that the successor or assigns shall be bound by the terms of this agreement."
Sexton's Steak House, Inc. 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 576 (1981) (Ross, Arb.). See generally Marsack &
Eaton, Successorship Law: The Impact on Business Transfers and Collective Bargaining, 65 MARQ.
L. REV. 213, 229-39 (1981) (separates successor clauses into three catagories: no contractual obliga-
tions, mild contractual obligations, and strong contractual obligations).
Successor clauses are becoming more common in collective bargaining agreements. See BNA,
BAsic PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 5 (10th ed. 1983) ("[Successor] clauses appear in 34% of
the agreements included in this study, compared to 29% in the 1979 study."). See also BNA, BASIc
PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 8 (8th ed. 1975) (1975 study showed only 22% of the agreements
contained successor clauses).
2. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1982), gives federal courts jurisdiction over actions alleging breach of a collective bargain-
ing agreement. See infra note 138 and accompanying text for the text of § 301.
3. Congress created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) to administer the
federal labor laws. The NLRB has the power to adjudicate claims alleging unfair labor practices
which violate the federal labor laws. See infra notes 115-120 and accompanying text.
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ers, unions, employees, and the public. 4
The Illinois General Assembly recently attempted to answer these
questions when it enacted section 2571 of the Illinois Labor Code. 5 This
statute places affirmative duties on the predecessor employer 6 and en-
forces the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement against a succes-
sor employer when the agreement contains a successor clause.7 This
legislation, which is representative of other state legislation, evidences a
policy of employee protection and a general dissatisfaction with the fed-
eral law's treatment of successor liability.8 However, the federal labor
laws9 threaten this statute with preemption.10
This Note reexamines the federal labor law treatment of successor lia-
bility and discusses state statutes that attempt to define the enforceability
of a successor clause in a collective bargaining agreement. Part I summa-
4. Predecessor employers have an interest in controlling their own businesses and in the free-
dom to transfer their businesses without restraints. Similarly, successor employers have an interest
in their ability to restructure the purchased company's operations and make workforce and work
assignment changes free from the constraints of the predecessors' collective bargaining agreements.
Employee interests include job security and the maintenance of rights, such as seniority or vacation
time, secured under collective bargaining agreements with the predecessors. Unions have an interest
in their own survival as bargaining representatives of the employees. The public has an interest in
peaceful resolution of labor disputes and stability in the labor market. The public may also have an
interest in allowing optimum operation of businesses and efficient allocation of resources. For a
discussion of these interests, see Marsack & Eaton, supra note I, at 215-17.
5. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2571 (Smith-Hurd 1987). This statute became effective Janu-
ary 1, 1988.
6. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2571 § l(d) (Smith-Hurd 1987). The predecessor employer
must disclose to the successor employer the existence of the collective bargaining agreement and the
successor clause and condition the sale on the successor's agreement to be bound by the clause. See
infra text accompanying notes 99-100.
7. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2571 § l(a) (Smith-Hurd 1987). The collective bargaining
agreement is enforceable against the successor regardless of whether the successor received notice of
the agreement's existence from the predecessor. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2571 § l(d) (Smith-
Hurd 1987). See infra text accompanying notes 101-04.
8. Illinois Governor James R. Thompson, although cautioning that the statute may be uncon-
stitutional, stated that it "constitutes sound public policy for Illinois." Letter from Governor James
R. Thompson to the Illinois House of Representatives 85th General Assembly (Sept. 10, 1987) (dis-
cussing why he had approved rather than vetoed the legislation).
9. This Note uses "labor laws" to refer generally to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA
or Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). Congress enacted the NLRA as the Wagner Act in 1935 to
provide recognition and bargaining rights to organized labor. Wagner Act ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449
(1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982)). Subsequent amendments to the NLRA
include the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1982)), and the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 29 U.S.C.).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 115-143.
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rizes the judicially created "federal successorship doctrine" which limits
the enforceability of the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement
against a successor employer. Part II discusses union efforts to negotiate
successor clauses and enforce them against predecessor employers. Part
III examines the Illinois statute, its possible federal preemption, and pol-
icy concerns that operate in opposition to such statutes. This Note con-
cludes that federal labor law preempts the Illinois statute and that the
blanket enforcement of successor clauses which the statute embodies is
unwise because it fails to consider the intent of the parties to the collec-
tive bargaining agreement containing a successor clause and because it
increases enforcement of the agreement against the successor employer
rather than against the predecessor employer.
I. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY: THE FEDERAL SUCCESSORSHIP DOCTRINE
The federal labor laws do not specifically address the obligations of a
successor employer under an unexpired collective bargaining agree-
ment.I1  To fill this void, the NLRB and the federal courts have devel-
oped a federal "common law" defining purchaser liability. 2 The
resultant "successorship doctrine"' 3 stems from policies embodied in the
federal labor laws: the parties' private determination of terms of employ-
11. See Slicker, A Reconsideration of the Doctrine of Employer Successorship--A Step Toward a
Rational Approach, 57 MINN. L. REy. 1051, 1053 n.3 (1973).
12. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) (A need for uniform-
ity in labor relations prompted the creation of a federal common law "fashioned from the policy of
our national labor laws."). See generally Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law,
99 HARV. L. REY. 883 (1986). See also John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 548
(1964) (A court may utilize state law "so far as it is of aid in the development of correct principles,"
but the result is federal common law.).
This federal common law includes the determination of when a purchaser is a "successor." A
purchaser must be deemed a successor before it can be subject to any obligations under a collective
bargaining agreement. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
13. The doctrine developed primarily through three Supreme Court decisions: Howard John-
son Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security
Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); and John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
Howard Johnson and Wiley were decided in the context of a LMRA § 301 suit to compel the succes-
sor to submit to arbitration under the predecessor's agreement. Burns concerned review of an unfair
labor practice proceeding brought before the NLRB alleging that the successor violated LMRA
§ 8(a)(5) by failing to recognize and bargain with the union. Although successorship decisions rely
on the application of labor law and policy to the particular facts of each case, a detailed factual
analysis of these cases is beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note focuses on the policy
concerns embodied in these decisions. Many commentators have analyzed these decisions at great
length. For a list of such articles see Comment, The Successorship Doctrine: In Search of a New
Focus, 17 WILLAMETTE L. Rav. 405, 407 n.3 (1981).
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ment,14 and peaceful resolution of labor disputes through the arbitration
process.15 The successorship doctrine attempts to balance the interests of
the parties involved in a business transfer without losing sight of these
labor policy goals.16
A. The General Rule and Successor Clauses
The successorship doctrine provides generally that a successor is not
bound by the substantive terms of its predecessor's unexpired collective
bargaining agreement unless the successor assumes those terms.17 This
rule applies regardless of the existence of a successor clause in the prede-
cessor's agreement. 18 Thus, it effectuates the national labor policy favor-
14. See NLRB v. Bums Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 282 (1972), discussed infra
text accompanying notes 21-26. See also, NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (purpose of Act to
promote industrial peace through free collective bargaining).
15. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 28-31.
16. The Supreme Court in Local 1424, Int'l Ass'n ofMachinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1980)
stated:
labor legislation traditionally entails the adjustment and compromise of competing inter-
ests which in the abstract or from a purely partisan point of view may seem irreconcilable.
The "policy of the Act" is embodied in the totality of that adjustment, and not necessarily
in any single demand which may have figured, however weightily in it.
Id. at 428.
17. A successor may expressly assume the collective bargaining agreement or impliedly assume
it by failing to express a contrary intent. A successor may avoid assumption of the agreement by
expressly stating those terms of the agreement it will not accept and setting up its own initial terms
of employment. Crystal & Spizzo, A Successors and Assigns Clause: The Duty to Adopt the Seller's
Labor Contract, 1 COMPLEAT LAWYER 41, 46-47 (Winter 1984) (outlining steps a buyer should
take to assure nonassumption of the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement). See also Burns,
406 U.S. at 284. Even when a successor is not bound by the substantive terms of the agreement, the
successor may have a duty to bargain with the union or a duty to arbitrate the extent of its obliga-
tions. Id. See infra Part I(B) & (C) for further discussion of these duties.
18. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 258 n.3 (1974). In
Howard Johnson, the union instituted a proceeding pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act to compel the purchaser, Howard Johnson Co., to arbitrate the extent of its obliga-
tions to the seller's employees. Id. at 253. The Court refused to bind Howard Johnson to the arbi-
tration clause of the predecessor's agreement and held that Howard Johnson was not a "true
successor" within the meaning of the federal successorship doctrine. The Court based this decision
on the "lack of substantial continuity of identity in the workforce." For a discussion of the factors
creating "true successor" status see infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. The Court stated that
a successor clause could not bind a purchaser absent a substantial continuity of workforce. Id. at
258 n.3. Such an observation implies that if a purchaser met the substantial continuity requirement
the successor clause could bind him to the substantive terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
Subsequent circuit court opinions, however, have rejected this implication. See Bartender & Culi-
nary Workers, Local 340 v. Howard Johnson Co., 535 F.2d 1160, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 1976) (The
court refused to impose the substantive terms of the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement on
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss2/11
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ing private determination of labor agreements without governmental
imposition of specific terms.19
This policy formed the basis for the Supreme Court's decision in
N.L.R.B. v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.20 In Burns, the
Court refused to enforce the NLRB's order compelling the successor to
honor the terms of the labor contract negotiated by the predecessor.21
The Court stated that the Board's order, in effect, forced the successor to
accept contract terms and therefore violated the policy of private deter-
mination embodied in section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations
Act.2 2 Section 8(d) provides for negotiations between the union and em-
ployer but does not obligate either to agree to specific terms.23
In addition, the Court emphasized that economic considerations make
binding a successor to the substantive terms of the predecessor's collec-
tive bargaining agreement unwise. The Court expressed concern that
binding a successor to the terms of the agreement would inhibit the pred-
the successor even though the agreement contained a successor clause, and the successor made no
changes in employees, and continued the same operations at the same facility under the same name.).
19. In addition, the rule facilitates the efficient redeployment of resources under new circum-
stances. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
20. 406 U.S. 272 (1972). In Burns the union filed a complaint with the NLRB alleging that the
purchaser's refusal to honor the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement constituted an unfair
labor practice. The Board agreed and the purchaser, Bums, sought judicial review. Id. at 276.
21. Id. at 291. The Board had stated, "[w]e find therefore, that Bums is bound to that contract
as if it were a signatory thereto, and that its failure to maintain the contract in effect is violative...
of the Act." William J. Bums Int'l Detective Agency, 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 349-50 (1971). The Burns
Court pointed out that this Board finding conflicted with previous Board decisions that consistently
held a successor is not bound to the substantive terms of the agreement. Burns, 406 U.S. at 284.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). Burns, 406 U.S. at 282-87. The Board argued that failure to
bind the successor as a matter of law would jeopardize the stability of labor relations and that
"employees [would] face uncertainty and a gap in the bargained-for terms and conditions of employ-
ment, as well as the possible loss of advantages gained by prior negotiations." Id. at 285. These may
represent some of the same concerns that Illinois and other state legislatures sought to address when
enacting successor clause statutes. The court, however, expressed economic concerns, id. at 284, and
further stated that allowing the Board to compel the successor to accept the agreement "would
violate the fundamental premise on which the Act is based-private bargaining under governmental
supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the actual terms of the
contract." Id. at 287 (quoting H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970)).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) (duty to bargain "does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal"). Some commentators have questioned the Court's reliance on § 8(d). See Silverstein,
The Fate of Workers in Successor Firms. Does Law Tame the Market? 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 153, 166-
67 (1986) (requiring the successor to be bound does not require Board interference with the sub-
stance of the agreement); Note, The Unenforceable Successorship Clause: A Departure from National
Labor Policy, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1249, 1261 n.77 (1983) (§ 8(d) appears to apply only after the
parties have failed to reach an agreement).
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ecessor's ability to transfer a failing business.24 A potential buyer may be
unwilling to purchase a failing business if he will be saddled with the
terms and conditions of a predecessor's collective bargaining agreement.
The agreement may prevent a successor from implementing changes nec-
essary to ensure the successful continuation of the business.2" Finally,
the Court emphasized that concessions made by either the union or the
successor should be based on "economic power realities" and not NLRB
or judicial intervention.26
B. The Duty to Arbitrate
In proceedings under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act to compel arbitration,27 courts have balanced the policy of private
determination with the preference for labor dispute resolution through
arbitration and, in the process, have provided some protection to em-
ployee interests. In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v, Livingston2 the Supreme
Court stated that employees require protection from a change in con-
trol29 and indicated a willingness to allow limited intervention in the bar-
24. Burns, 406 U.S. at 287-88. This restraint on alienation may frustrate the "need to redistrib-
ute the assets of an unprofitable business into the economy." Note, supra note 23, at 1264.
25. Burns, 406 U.S. at 287-88. A purchaser of a failing business may find it necessary to under-
take "changes in corporate structure, composition of the labor force, work location, task assignment,
and nature of supervision. Saddling such an employer with the terms and conditions of employment
contained in the old collective-bargaining contract may make these charges impossible and may
discourage and inhibit the transfer of capital." Id. One student commentator addresses these con-
cerns by arguing that a successor should be bound to the terms of the predecessor's agreement unless
the business transfer was based on economic necessity. Note, supra note 23, at 1275-80.
26. Burns, 406 U.S. at 288. The Court stated that the Act allows the parties to bargain for the
protections that they deem appropriate based on their relative bargaining strength. The Court con-
cluded that if the terms of the employment contract did not correspond with the parties, relative
economic strength industrial strife would ensue. Free collective bargaining, however, would ensure
labor peace. Id. For the role of economic power realities in defining successor status, see infra notes
35-41 and accompanying text.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
28. 376 U.S. 543 (1964). Wiley arose in the context of a merger which caused the dissolution of
the original employing entity. Ordinarily, successorship analysis ignores distinctions among merg-
ers, consolidations, or purchases of assets. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182
n.5 (1973). However, one possible distinction may exist because the dissolution of the original em-
ploying entity through a merger deprives the union and employees of a proceeding against the prede-
cessor employer. See, Howard Johnson Co., Inc. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249,
257 (1974) (Court distinguished Wiley because Howard Johnson involved a sale of assets and the
predecessor employer remained in existence whereas in Wiley the predecessor disappeared in the
merger and if the union did not have some remedy against the successor, it could not enforce the
agreement).
29. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549. The Court stressed a lack of consideration of employee interests in
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss2/11
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gaining process to effectuate the federal preference for arbitration.
Although this policy does not require that a successor adopt all substan-
tive terms of the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement, the
courts may bind a successor to the arbitration provision of the agree-
ment.30 Therefore, a court may compel a successor to arbitrate the ex-
tent of its obligations under the predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement. As a result, a successor may become bound to certain terms
of the preexisting agreement.31
C. The Duty to Bargain
The policy of private determination of employment terms by free col-
lective bargaining also provides some protection to a union's status as
bargaining representative. Unions have successfully alleged to the Board
that the purchaser engages in an unfair labor practice by refusing to bar-
gain with the union as representative of the employees.32 Although the
Court in Burns refused to bind the successor to the substantive terms of
the predecessor's agreement, it held that the NLRB could order a succes-
sor employer to recognize and bargain with an incumbent union.33 This
sale negotiations and stated "[t]he objectives of national labor policy, reflected in established princi-
ples of federal law, require that the rightful prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their
businesses and even eliminate themselves as employers be balanced by some protection to the em-
ployees from a sudden change in the employment relationship." Id.
30. See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960) (characterizing arbitration as a "substitute for industrial strife" and a "part and parcel of the
collective bargaining process itself"). Wiley, 376 U.S. at 548. The court qualified this duty to arbi-
trate, however, by holding that the duty to arbitrate would not survive a business transfer absent
substantial continuity of the business enterprise, i.e., the purchaser would have to qualify as a "suc-
cessor." Id. at 551. See infra text accompany notes 39-41.
31. In United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 895 (3rd Cir. 1964), for
example, the court stated that an arbitrator should consider any new circumstances resulting from
the business transfer to determine the successor's obligations and that any terms of the preexisting
agreement that remain as an "embodiment of the law of the shop" should apply to the successor. Id.
at 895. The precedential value of Reliance is, however, in doubt after Howard Johnson v. Detroit
Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974) (refusing to extend Wiley to a successor who did not
hire many of the predecessors employees).
32. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). This
mandate is subject to the provisions of § 159(a). Section 159(a) provides that "[r]epresentatives
designated or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a
unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining .. " 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
33. Burns, 406 U.S. at 281-90. However, the Court determined that a successor employer is
ordinarily free to unilaterally establish the initial terms of employment. Id. at 294. See supra text
accompanying notes 20-26.
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duty to bargain arises when a successor employer retains a majority of
the predecessor's employees, and therefore keeps a certified bargaining
unit intact.34
D. The Definition of Successor
The duty to arbitrate and the duty to bargain have some basis in the
"economic power realities" of the parties35 because for either of these
duties to apply, a purchaser must qualify as a successor. In making this
determination, the Board in duty to bargain cases 36 and the federal
courts in duty to arbitrate cases37 apply a "substantial continuity" test.38
Under this test, successor status turns on whether a majority of the suc-
cessor's employees were previously employed by the predecessor. 39
Therefore, if the labor market is elastic and a purchaser may readily re-
place the predecessor's employees, the purchaser can avoid successor sta-
tus.' ° On the other hand, a purchaser may find it necessary or more
34. Id. at 287. In Burns, the employees recently had elected the union as their bargaining
representative and the purchaser then hired a majority of the predecessor's employees. Id. The
Supreme Court expanded this holding in Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 107 S.Ct.
2225 (1987). In Fall River the Court held that the successor's duty to bargain is not limited to
situations where the employees recently certified the union as their representative. The court stated
that where a union has a rebuttable presumption of majority status, that status continues despite the
business transfer, and regardless of a seven months hiatus in operations. Id. at 2235.
35. Burns, 406 U.S. at 288. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
36. See Mondovi Foods Corp., 235 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1978).
37. See Howard Johnson v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 260 (1974).
38. John Wiley & Sons Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964).
39. In Mondovi, 235 NLRB at 1082, the Board stated that after a threshold finding that a
majority of the successor's employees were those of the predecessor, it considers a variety of factors
in applying the substantial continuity test. Id. at 1082. Factors that provide for substantial con-
tinuity include continuation of business operations without interruption, use of the same facilities,
production of the same products and services, and retention of the same customers. Id. at 1082. The
weight of each of these factors, however, is uncertain. Id. at 1082. See also Fall River, 107 S.Ct. at
2237, where the Court stated, "We do not find determinative of the successorship question the fact
that there was a 7-month hiatus between [the predecessor's] demise and [the successor's] start-up."
The Court instead chose to focus on the employee's perspective and "whether 'those employees who
have been retained will understandably view their job situations as essentially unaltered.'" Id. at
2236 (quoting Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184 (1973)).
In Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. 249, the Supreme Court applied this "majority of employees" test in
a duty to arbitrate context. Justice Douglas dissented from this holding. He argued that the succes-
sor inquiry should focus on the other factors: continued business without interruption, same facili-
ties, same products, and same general operation. Id. at 267-69 (Douglas, J., dissenting), Douglas
characterized reliance on majority of employees as a "sheer bootstrap" argument. "The effect is to
allow any new employer to determine for himself whether he will be bound, by the simple expedient
of arranging for the termination of all of the prior employer's personnel." Id. at 268-69.
40. However, the purchaser cannot refuse to hire the employees of the predecessor solely be-
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efficient to hire the predecessor's employees.41 The purchaser would then
qualify as a successor within the meaning of the federal doctrine.
II. UNION EFFORTS TO BIND THE PREDECESSOR EMPLOYER
In response to the federal successorship doctrine holding that a succes-
sor is not bound by the terms of an unexpired collective bargaining agree-
ment unless he assumes them, unions often argue that successor clauses
require the predecessor to condition a sale of the business on the pur-
chaser's assumption of the agreement. In determining the effect of a suc-
cessor clause on a predecessor, as with a successor, courts have balanced
the interests of the employer and employee through the policies of free
collective bargaining and arbitration.
A. Successor Clause: A Mandatory Subject of Bargaining
Section 8(d) of the NLRA advances the policy of private determina-
tion of contract terms, requiring employers and unions to meet and nego-
tiate in good faith concerning "wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment."42 These topics are mandatory subjects of
bargaining43 and either party's refusal to bargain over them constitutes
an unfair labor practice." Issues unrelated to wages, hours, or terms and
cause of their union membership or to avoid having to recognize the union. Such discrimination is
prohibited as an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
Subject to this limitation, a purchaser is free to hire a whole new workforce. Howard Johnson, 417
U.S. at 263.
41. Underlying the court's rationale, then, is the notion that "the operation of a market econ-
omy will impose sufficient control on successor discretion to make explicit protection of worker
interests unnecessary." Silverstein, supra note 23, at 160. See Burns, 406 U.S. at 291. ("In many
cases, of course, successor employers will find it advantageous not only to recognize and bargain
with the union but also to observe the pre-existing contract rather than to face uncertainty and
turmoil."). Id. See also Fasman & Fischler, Labor Relations, Consequences of Mergers and Acquisi-
tions, 13 EMPL. REL. L.J. 14, 29 (1987). A purchaser who repudiates the existing contract would
lose the protection of any no-strike clauses and if the union retained representative status it would be
free to strike when the ownership was transferred. Id. at 29.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). Section 8(d) further provides that "such an obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." Id. See infra text
accompanying notes 20-23.
43. NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). The broad
language of § 8(d) requires that the NLRB, subject to judicial review, determine the scope of the
mandatory bargaining requirement. See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979).
44. An employer's refusal to bargain constitutes an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982), a union's refusal under § 8(b)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(3) (1982). Refusal to bargain subjects the uncooperative party to an NLRB order to bar-
gain and to a variety of sanctions for noncompliance. NLRA § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982).
1989]
Washington University Open Scholarship
584 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 67:575
conditions of employment are permissive subjects of bargaining.45 Per-
missive subjects normally entail an employer's relationship with third
persons. The Act does not require employers and unions to bargain over
permissive subjects.46
Union proposals in collective agreement negotiations may include a
successor clause requiring the employer to condition a transfer of the
business on the buyer's assumption of the agreement.4 7 Although this
type of successor clause carries the indicia of a permissive bargaining
topic because it concerns the employer's relationship with a third party,
the Tenth Circuit in Lone Star Steel Co. v. NLRB48 upheld an NLRB
finding that such a clause4 9 is a mandatory subject of bargaining.5" This
holding allows a union to bargain to an impasse over such a clause and to
submit the issue to arbitration.51 In reaching this conclusion, the court
45. This characterization stems from the labor law policy of deference to management preroga-
tives in making business decisions. See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203
(1964). See also Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America, Local No. I v. Pittsburgh Plate &
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1978) (mandatory subjects include only those issues that settle an
aspect of the employer-employee relationship).
46. See NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (Employ-
ers and unions are "free to bargain or not to bargain, and to agree or not to agree" about permissive
bargaining subjects.). A party's insistence on bargaining about a permissive subject can constitute a
lack of good faith in the negotiations and violate § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). Id. at 352.
47. For an example of typical language, see supra note I.
48. 639 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1980).
49. In Lone Star, the union proposed the following clause: "Employer promises that its opera-
tions covered by this Agreement shall not be sold, conveyed, or otherwise transferred or assigned to
any successor without first securing the agreement of the successor to assume the Employer's obliga-
tions under this Agreement." Id. at 548.
50. Id. at 556. The Lone Star court reviewed the Board's application of two tests: first,
whether the proposed subject of bargaining "vitally affects" the terms and conditions of employ-
ment, id. at 554; Allied Chemical Workers & Alkali Workers of America, Local No. I v. Pittsburgh
Plate & Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1978); see infra text accompanying note 52; and second,
whether the clause deals with the employer's decision to sell or instead with the effects of that deci-
sion, Lone Star, 639 F.2d at 556, see supra note 45, infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
51. Lone Star, 639 F.2d at 553. If an issue is a mandatory subject of bargaining, the proponent
of a proposal regarding the subject may bargain to impasse and submit resolution of the issue to
arbitration. If not mandatory, the subject is permissive and the proponent may not insist on it to
impasse. See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
In Lone Star, the company found the successor clause unacceptable. The parties failed to reach an
agreement through negotiation and the union went on strike. The company then filed an unfair
labor practice charge against the union. The company alleged that the successor clause violated the
"hot cargo" provisions of § 8(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982). Id. at 547-48. Section 8(e)
provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter
into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or re-
frains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss2/11
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emphasized that an issue involving third parties may be a mandatory
subject of bargaining if it "vitally affects" the terms and conditions of
employment. 2 The court rejected Lone Star's contention that the
Board's application of this test was clearly erroneous because the Board
failed to consider the employer's freedom to dispose of capital assets.53
First, the court interpreted the Board's decision as a correct resolution of
the competing interests, including the employer's freedom to dispose of
capital assets. 4 Second, the court found Lone Star's reliance on previous
Supreme Court decisions in successor cases misplaced.5 The successor
eases were efforts to bind a successor employer to its predecessor's obli-
gations by operation of law. In contrast, Lone Star raised the issue of
"an agreement that a successor would be bound by the previous bargain-
ing contract.",5
6
Lone Star further argued that the successor clause would inhibit man-
agement's discretion to sell the business and therefore constituted a per-
missive subject of bargaining.57 The court rejected this argument,
concluding that the successor clause addressed only the effect of a deci-
sion to sell (in other words, maintaining the terms and conditions of the
workers' employment) and not the decision itself. 8 Therefore the clause
dealing in any of the products of any other employer or to cease doing business with any
other person...
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982) (emphasis added).
The NLRB held and the court affirmed that the sale or transfer of an entire business enterprise did
not constitute "doing business with" in the meaning of § 8(e) and therefore a successor clause would
not violate § 8(e). 639 F.2d at 549.
52. Id. at 554 (quoting Allied Chemical, 404 U.S. at 179).
53. 639 F.2d at 554-55.
54. Id. at 555 n.21. The court went on to state that accepting the employer's "contention
would mean that an employer's freedom to rearrange his business would not be balanced... by some
protection to the employees from a sudden change in the employment relationship." Id.
55. Id. at 555 n.21, 556. Lone Star cited NLRB v. Bums Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S.
272 (1972) and Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974), in support of
its position that the proposed successor clause must be a permissive subject of bargaining. This
follows, Lone Star argued, because imposing the affirmative duty to bargain is the functional
equivalent of the restraints disallowed in Burns and Howard Johnson. Lone Star, 639 F.2d at 554.
Rejecting the argument, the court distinquished successor cases because in those decisions the
Supreme Court expressed concern over the Board compelling a successor to honor terms it did not
agree to, while in the case of a predecessor the Board merely requires that the parties negotiate and
come to their own terms. Id. at 555.
56. Id. at 555-56 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 556. Lone Star relied on Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203
(1964), which held that a decision to sell is a prerogative of management and not subject to
bargaining.
58. Lone Star, 639 F.2d at 556. Accord General Motors Corp., GMC Truck and Coach Divi-
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did not impinge on management's discretion.
Lone Star advances employee protection through private determina-
tion by the parties. It increases the likelihood that the parties will actu-
ally bargain over specific successor language. Through proposals and
counterproposals the parties can negotiate and decide for themselves the
extent of their duties in the event of a sale of the business. The company
can calculate the importance of free transferability of its business and
negotiate accordingly.5 9 Similarly, the union, as bargaining representa-
tive of the employees, can determine the importance of requiring the
company to condition a sale of the business on the buyer's assumption of
the agreement and negotiate accordingly. 60
B. Union Efforts to Bind Predecessors to Successor Clauses
In Howard Johnson Company v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board61
the Supreme Court suggested that a union could move to enjoin a sale of
the business on the ground that in violation of the successor clause, the
predecessor employer failed to condition the sale on the buyer's assump-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement.62 Unions have followed this
suggestion and have successfully enjoined sales and mergers pending ar-
bitration of the predecessor's duties under the collective bargaining
agreement.63 Furthermore, arbitrators have found that successor clauses
can obligate an employer to condition a sale of the business on the suc-
cessor's assumption of the collective bargaining agreement. 64
sion, 191 N.L.R.B. 951, petition for review denied, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (decision to sell not
a mandatory subject of bargaining but the effects of the decision are).
59. If management is concerned that in a time of economic hardship the successor clause will
jeopardize its ability to sell the business, it may negotiate for appropriate conditions limiting the
application of the successor clause. The clause could provide that if a sale or transfer of the business
becomes an economic necessity the parties will renegotiate the successor clause. When faced with a
possible failure of the business, the union may be willing to agree to some concessions to make the
business more attractive to a potential employer.
60. One possible alternative to a traditional successor clause is a clause requiring that the buyer
notify the union of sale negotiations and of the buyer's intent with respect to the collective bargain-
ing agreement.
61. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
62. Id. at 258 n.3. "The Union apparently did not explore another remedy which might have
been available to it prior to the sale, le., moving to enjoin the sale... on the ground that this was a
breach by the [predecessor] of the successorship clauses in the collective-bargaining agreements."
Id.
63. See infra notes 65-87 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
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L Standards for Granting Pre-Sale Injunctions
In determining whether a pre-sale injunction is appropriate, courts at-
tempt to strike a balance between the federal labor policy opposing judi-
cial interference in labor disputes and the policy promoting peaceful
resolution of labor disputes through voluntary arbitration. Therefore, a
court may enjoin an employer's action only if the injunction is necessary
to effectuate the parties' agreement to arbitrate.65 Because of this limita-
tion, the union must first establish that the collective bargaining agree-
ment mandates arbitration of the issue of enforcing the successor
clause.66
Generally, if the collective bargaining agreement contains a broad ar-
bitration clause67 a court will apply a presumption of arbitrability68 and
conclude that a grievance to enforce a successor clause is one the parties
intended to submit to arbitration.69 However, some courts express con-
65. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 407 (1976) (Court refused to
issue injunction where underlying dispute not subject to arbitration provision of the agreement);
Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (created exception to the federal
labor law's broad prohibition of federal court injunctions in labor disputes); Local Lodge No. 1266 v.
Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 281-83 (7th Cir. 1981) (court issued status quo injunction pending
arbitration).
66. In Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d at 283, the court stated that "[i]njunctions against employer
breaches of collective bargaining agreements . . . [are] available, in aid of arbitration, where the
underlying dispute is subject to mandatory arbitration under the labor contract and where an injunc-
tion is necessary to prevent arbitration from being rendered a meaningless ritual." Id. See also
UAW v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 656 F. Supp. 1283, 1286 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (employer can
obtain an injunction if a strike is subject to mandatory arbitration).
67. A typical collective bargaining agreement provides a grievance procedure and an arbitra-
tion clause which allows the parties to submit many unresolved grievances to arbitration. A broad
arbitration clause may provide, for example, that the parties agree to arbitrate "any dispute between
the parties involving the interpretation or application of any provisions of this agreement." Nursing
Home & Hospital Union v. Sky Vue Terrace, 759 F.2d 1094, 1097 (3rd Cir. 1985).
68. The Supreme Court stated this presumption in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960). "An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should
not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not suscepti-
ble of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of
coverage." Id. at 582-83.
69. See UAW v. Goodyear Aerospace, 656 F. Supp. 1283, 1286 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (court used
presumption to determine arbitrability of a successor clause) (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior
and Gulf Navigation Co. 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960) where the Court stated that doubts as to an
arbitration clause's coverage should be resolved in favor of arbitration)). However, in Local Lodge
No. 1266 v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 283 (7th Cir. 1981), the court indicated a willingness to
apply some scrutiny to the question rather than broadly applying the presumption, although the
Panoramic court did not reach the question of the arbitrability of the successor clause dispute be-
cause the employer conceded it. The court also discussed the statements of commentators that indi-
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cern over summarily applying the presumption. 7° They reason that a
court cannot compel arbitration unless the court finds that the parties
had agreed contractually to submit that issue to arbitration.71
If the court finds the successorship dispute arbitrable, the court may
compel arbitration but cannot issue an injunction prohibiting a sale pend-
ing arbitration unless the union meets the traditional requirements for
injunctive relief.72 The union must show: 1) breach or threatened breach
of the agreement; 2) that irreparable harm will result absent the injunc-
tion; and 3) that the hardship placed on the union if the injunction is
denied outweighs the hardship to the employer if the injunction is
granted.73
In determining whether there is a threatened breach of the agreement,
courts consider the existence of an interested purchaser and the extent of
any sale negotiations.74 Courts also consider evidence of an employer's
intent not to include in the sale contract a provision binding the pur-
chaser to the collective agreement.75
Irreparable harm to the union and employees consists mostly of frus-
tration of the arbitration process. 76 If the court allowed an employer to
cate a fear that broad application of the presumption in injunction actions against employers would
alter the relative bargaining power of the parties. Id. at 283-84.
70. See Nursing Home & Hospital Union No. 434 v. Sky Vue Terrace, Inc., 759 F.2d 1094,
1097 (3rd Cir. 1985) (court refused to apply presumption and scrutinized the arbitration clause);
International Union United Automobile, Aerospace and Agriculture Implement Workers of
America v. Lester Engineering Co. 718 F.2d 818, 823-24 (1983) (although arbitration clause should
be read "indulgently" a court should also scrutinize the management prerogative clause); Pano-
ramic, 668 F.2d 276, 283, discussed supra note 66.
71. Sky Vue Terrace, 756 F.2d at 1097; Lester Engineering, 718 F.2d at 823.
72. See Panoramic, 668 F.2d 276. The court in Panoramic did not require that the union show
a likelihood of success on the merits, however. The court stated that the union must show only that
its claim is sound enough to prevent arbitration from being a "futile endeavor." Id. at 284-85. See
infra text accompanying notes 88-89. See also Sky Vue Terrace, 759 F.2d at 1098. (Enjoining an
employer must be necessary to "ensure the arbitral process will not be frustrated. .. ").
73. Sky Vue Terrace, 759 F.2d at 1098; Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 284-89; UAW v. Goodyear
Aerospace Corp., 656 F. Supp. 1283, 1286 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
74. See Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 656 F. Supp. at 1291 (The court considered the company's
public announcement that it intended to sell the division relevant to the threatened breach inquiry.).
75. Id. at 1291. In Goodyear.Aerospace Corp., the employer had expressly refused the union's
request to include a provision in the sales contract that required the buyer to assume the collective
bargaining agreement. Id.
76. The Third Circuit in Panoramic stated that in the context of a pre-sale injunction
"[i]rreparable injury means not simply any injury resulting from a breach of contract that would not
be fully redressed by an arbitral award, but rather 'injury so irreparable that a decision of the [arbi-
tration] Board in the union['s] favor would be but an empty victory.'" Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 285-
86 (quoting Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 363 U.S. 528,
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complete the sale prior to arbitration of the employer's responsibilities,
the arbitrator would be faced with a "fait accompli";77 the arbitrator's
decision that the employer had a duty to condition the sale would prove
useless.78 In the event of a completed sale, if the arbitration clause cov-
ered the alleged breach of the successor clause, the union could seek
damages from the predecessor through the arbitrator,79 or initiate an ac-
tion to enforce the collective bargaining agreement against the successor
under the federal successorship doctrine."0 However, the damage pro-
ceeding may not provide the union and employees with an adequate rem-
edy 8 and the successor action ordinarily would fail.
Injunctions provide the union with significant leverage and may limit
the employer's freedom to transfer the business. Courts effectively ad-
dress the competing interests, however, by a thorough analysis of the
balance of hardships in each case.82 Absent the injunction, the employees
may face permanent job loss, reduction in salary, and loss of seniority or
other benefits.83 Constrained by the injunction, an employer may lose
the opportunity to sell the business, and suffer economic hardship from
534 (1960)). The court characterized this inquiry as focusing "into a single concept the twin ideas of
irreparable injury and frustration of arbitration." 668 F.2d at 286.
77. UAW v. Goodyear, 656 F. Supp. at 1287.
78. Id.
79. See, eg., Local No. 381, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers v. Tosco Corp., 823 F.2d 265
(8th Cir. 1987). In Tosco, the union brought a post-sale action to compel the predecessor to arbitrate
the union's claims for severance pay and enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement. The
district court refused to compel arbitration, reasoning that the successor was not obligated to accept
the terms of the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement as a matter of law. The Eighth Cir-
cuit, however, found that the district court addressed the wrong question. The Eighth Circuit found
that the question concerned whether the predecessor had an obligation to condition the sale on the
purchaser's assumption of the existing collective bargaining agreement, not whether a purchaser was
obligated to assume those terms under the successorship doctrine. The question arose directly out of
the collective bargaining agreement between the predecessor and the union and therefore the court
could compel the predecessor to arbitrate. Id. at 267.
80. See supra notes 11-26 and accompanying text. One court has upheld a union action against
the purchaser for tortious interference with contract. See Mine Workers v. Eastover Mining Co. 623
F. Supp. 1041 (W.D. Va. 1985) (purchaser tortiously interfered with the union and seller's contrac-
tual relationship by inducing the seller to sell the business without language in the purchase contract
binding the purchaser).
81. See Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 286 (agreeing that an action for damages would be available but
expressing concern that where a permanent loss of jobs is threatened, the damages remedy would be
inadequate).
82. Id. at 289. The court stated that the issuance of injunctions against business transfers
"could in many cases be extremely disruptive and costly. Hence, we emphasize the need for search-
ing analysis of the facts and law peculiarly applicable to each case when confronted by a request for
the sort of injunction sought here." Id.
83. Id. at 288. The Panoramic employees faced a permanent loss of employment. Id.
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continuing deficit operations or closing the business. 84
While a balance of hardships turns on the specific facts of each case,
some common factors exist. The threatened permanent loss of jobs
weighs heavily in a court's decision to grant an injunction.85 However,
courts will consider whether an employer's decision is compelled by eco-
nomic necessity or whether it is part of an ordinary business decision.86
If the decision to sell results from economic necessity, the possible harm
to the employer company and the public may outweigh the employees'
potential job loss. 7
2. Arbitration Decisions
Courts do not require that the union show a likelihood of prevailing on
the merits of its claim when considering a petition for injunctive relief.88
Thus, the courts will not analyze the successor clause to determine
whether the language supports a contention that the seller must condi-
tion the sale on the buyer's assumption of the labor agreement. Such an
analysis would constitute judicial interference in the arbitral process. 89
However, this rule has resulted in injunctive relief from a sale where the
relevant language appears merely as a boiler plate "successors and as-
84. Id. at 288-89. Panoramic alleged that it would lose the opportunity to accept an offer of a
$4.5 million purchase price, and would be forced to operate a business it wished to sell. However,
the Supreme Court in Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 363
U.S. 528, 534-35 (1960), stated that hardships to the employees may outweigh the employer's hard-
ship of maintaining a costly operation.
85. UAW v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 656 F. Supp. 1283, 1292 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
86. Id. In Goodyear, the parent company alleged that the sale of its subsidiary was necessary to
raise capital to fend off a hostile takeover attempt. Id. at 1295.
87. Id. But see Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 363
U.S. 528, 534-35 (employee hardships may outweigh cost of maintaining operation).
Courts have also considered other factors when balancing the hardships. In Goodyear, the court
denied the motion for an injunction. The court weighed not only the company's need to raise capi-
tal, but also the company's intention to find a buyer who would continue to run the business and
keep the current workforce in place. The court also expressed concern that only one third of the
employees were union members covered by the contract. In addition, the court considered, but did
not give much weight to, the impact of the injunction on the community in which the business was
located. Goodyear at 1295. See also Northcross v. Board of Education, 444 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir.
1971) (court discussed the public interest when considering balance of hardships).
88. See supra note 72. Proving likelihood of success on the merits is traditionally a precondi-
tion to a preliminary injunction. E.g., United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
89. Local Lodge No. 1266 v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 284 (7th Cir. 1981). The court
stated that a requirement that the union show a likelihood of prevailing on the merits would "in-
trude significantly on the arbitrator's function and would constitute ... judicial preemption of the
arbitral process." Id.
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signs" clause in the preamble of the agreement.9°
The arbitrator's primary concern is to determine the parties' intent
when they entered the agreement.91 To determine intent, arbitrators fo-
cus on the actual language of the successor clause. The successor clause
must "clearly and unambiguously" require the employer to obtain the
purchaser's assumption of the collective bargaining agreement as a con-
dition of sale.92 Absent other circumstances, general "successors and as-
signs" language in the preamble of the agreement is usually insufficient to
force the employer to make the sale conditional.93 Other circumstances
that may affect the arbitrator's decision include the bargaining history of
the parties.94 An arbitrator may review early drafts of the agreement and
compare those with the final draft to determine the parties' final intent.95
By focusing on the language of the successor clause and the party's bar-
gaining history, the arbitrator assures that the parties get what they
sought in bargaining.
III. STATE SUCCESSOR STATUTES AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION
In an effort to protect employees, state legislatures have enacted stat-
utes that require enforcement of successor clauses against both the prede-
90. Id. at 278. The Panoramic contract merely provided that it was "binding on the employer,
its successors and assigns." Id. The injunction granted in Panoramic apparently resulted in cancel-
lation of the transaction. See Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1982 at 1.
91. Gallivan's, Inc., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 253, 259-60 (1982) (Gallagher, Arb.).
92. Id. at 254. See also Martin Podany Associates, 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 658, 662 (1983) (Gal-
lagher, Arb.) ("clear contractual language" imposing a requirement of assumption). An example of
language that "clearly and unambiguously" binds an employer is language that states "[t]he Em-
ploycr shall make it a condition of transfer that the successor or assigns shall be bound by the terms
of this agreement." Sexton's Steak House, Inc., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 576 (1981) (Ross, Arb.) (arbi-
trator enjoined sale until the seller complied with this language).
93. See Gallivan's Inc., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 253, 258 (1982) (Gallagher, Arb.) ("The obligation
to require assumption is imposed if it is set out in express terms; it is not imposed if the clause is
nothing more than a recitation that successors are to be bound."); National Tea Co., 59 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 1193, 1197-98 (no obligation to require assumption where language does not specifically
require it); Walker Bros., 41 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 844 (1983) (Crawford, Arb.) (general successors and
assigns clause may be nothing more than boiler plate language having no significance to the parties).
See also Fasman & Fischler, supra note 41 at 26-27 and n.ll (compares arbitration decisions where
union seeking damages for seller's failure to require that the buyer assume the collective bargaining
agreement); Crystal & Brodecki, Are Successors and Assigns Clauses Really Binding?, 38 LAB. L.J.
547, 558-59 (1987).
94. Gallivan's Inc., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 253, 255-56 (1982) (Gallagher, Arb.) (arbitrator took
extreme care to track the negotiations from initiation to final agreement).
95. Id. at 255.
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cessor and successor employer.96 These statutes face preemption under
several federal labor law doctrines.97 More significantly, these statutes
may be unwise due to their inflexibility and interference with private de-
termination of labor contracts. First, these statutes fail to consider the
language of the specific successor clauses and the intent of the parties.
Second, these statutes enforce the agreement against the wrong party-
the purchaser rather than the seller.
A. The Illinois Successor Clause Statute
The Illinois successor clause statute parallels the statutes of several
other states. 98 The statute places an affirmative duty on an employer
who is a party to a collective bargaining agreement with a successor
clause to disclose to a successor the existence of the collective bargaining
agreement and successor clause.99 This disclosure requirement demands
more than mere notice to the purchaser. The statute states that the pred-
ecessor shall satisfy his disclosure requirement by including in the con-
tract of sale a statement that the successor is bound by the successor
clause.'0 This provision forces an employer to condition the sale on
the purchaser's acceptance of the unexpired collective bargaining agree-
ment whether the language of the successor clause requires it or not.
The statute also provides that the collective bargaining agreement is
binding upon and enforceable against the successor employer 01 for not
96. See, eg., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1127 (Deering 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2571,
2572 (Smith-Hurd 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 179(C) (West 1979); OiIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 4113.30 (Pages 1978).
97. See infra text accompanying notes 109-43. Several state legislatures foresaw this problem
and provided an exemption for employers who are subject to the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151 et. seq. (1982), or the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et. seq. (1982). See CAL.
LAB. CODE § 179(c) (Deering 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149 § 179(c) (West 1979); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 4113.30 (D)(2) (Pages 1978). These exemptions leave only limited situations in
which the state provisions could apply. See Note, supra note 26, at 1273-74 (California statute was
enacted in 1976 and as of 1983 no reported case had applied it to bind a successor employer to the
predecessor's agreement). The Illinois statute, by contrast, contains no such exemption.
98. See supra note 96. The statutory language is substantially the same in each of these
statutes.
99. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2571(d) (Smith-Hurd 1987).
100. Id.
101. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2571(a) provides:
Where a collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a labor organization
contains a successor clause, such clause shall be binding upon and enforceable against any
successor employer who succeeds to the contracting employer's business, until the expira-
tion date of the agreement therein stated. No such successor clause shall be binding upon
or enforceable against any successor employer for more than 3 years from the effective date
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more than three years from the effective date of the agreement,102 even if
the predecessor did not disclose its existence to the successor. 103 Neither
the Illinois statute nor its legislative history gives any guidance to the
interpretation of the "binding upon and enforceable against" language.
One could argue that this language binds the successor to the substantive
terms of the agreement-a statutorily forced assumption of the agree-
ment-or instead merely implies a duty to arbitrate-binding the succes-
sor only to the arbitration provision."° The statute taken as a whole and
the three-year time limit on the "binding upon and enforceable against"
language support the argument that the legislature intended to bind the
successor to the substantive terms of the agreement. 0 5
The enforcement provision of the Illinois statute provides that "who-
ever" violates the Act is guilty of a business offense punishable by a fine
not to exceed $5,000. "Whoever" is broad enough to include both a
predecessor who fails to disclose the existence of the agreement and a
successor who refuses to accept the agreement. The statute does not ad-
dress who may enforce the provision or whether a private right of action
exists. Thus, the question remains whether the statute may be enforced
in a criminal or civil action, or both.10 7
of the collective bargaining agreement between the contracting employer and the labor
organization.
The statutory definition of successor includes, "any purchaser [who] conducts or will conduct sub-
stantially the same business operation, or offer the same service, and use the same physical facilities,
as the contracting employer." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2571(b) (Smith-Hurd 1987). This
definition includes several of the factors the federal courts use to determine successor status. See
supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
102. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2571(a) (Smith-Hurd 1987); see supra note 101.
103. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2571(d).
104. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text and supra note 101.
105. See supra note 101. Although para. (a) states that "the successor clause shall [not] be bind-
ing upon or enforceable against" a successor for not more than three years, para. (d) states that
failure to disclose the collective bargaining agreement does "not affect the enforceability of such
collective bargaining agreement against a successor employer." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para.
2571(a),(d) (Smith-Hurd 1987) (emphasis added). In addition, it wouldn't make sense to impose a
duty to arbitrate for three years after the date of the agreement.
106. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2572 (Smith-Hurd 1987).
107. It is likely that the statute would provide a private right of action. The $5,000 fine alone
may not provide an effective deterrent to violating the statute. A successor or a predecessor may be
willing to pay the fine in order to avoid the provisions of the statute.
Further, a court may find it fair to allow a successor who is bound to a contract for three years (or
fined) to recover from a predecessor who violated the act by not warning the successor of the exist-
ence of the successorship clause.
The Massachusetts statute expressly provides for both criminal and civil enforcement. MAss.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 179(c) (West 1979).
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B. Federal Labor Law Preemption
Prior to passage of the Illinois statute, Illinois legislative analysts gen-
erally concluded that the statute would be preempted by the federal labor
laws. 108 The preemptive effect of federal law stems from the supremacy
clause of the Constitution. 1 9 The NLRA contains no provision ex-
pressly stating a congressional intent to preempt state and local regula-
tion.110 When Congress does not specifically address the issue, "courts
sustain a local regulation unless it conflicts with federal law or would
frustrate the federal scheme, or unless courts discern from the totality of
circumstances that Congress sought to occupy the field to the exclusion
of the states." ''
Courts have developed several separate but related labor law preemp-
tion doctrines which are relevant to the Illinois statute. In San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon,"12 the Supreme Court outlined two
separate preemption inquiries. The NLRA preempts a state or local reg-
ulation if: 1) the state seeks to regulate activity that falls within the
NLRB's jurisdiction over unfair labor practices; or 2) the state seeks to
regulate activity that Congress intended to leave unregulated, and
thereby upsets the balance of power between labor and management es-
tablished by the Act."I3 A third preemption doctrine preempts state reg-
ulation or state causes of action that interfere with the federal courts'
jurisdiction over violations of collective bargaining agreements."t 4
108. MATHIS, ILLINOIS SENATE REPUBLICAN STAFF ANALYSIS, HOUSE BILL 332 (June 10,
1987); D. GROSS, ILLINOIS SENATE DEMOCRATS ANALYSIS, HOUSE BILL 332 (May 28, 1987); C.
MELAMED, ILLINOIS HOUSE DEMOCRATS ANALYSIS, HOUSE BILL 332 (April 26, 1987); J. MEUL-
LER, ILLINOIS HOUSE REPUBLICAN STAFF ANALYSIS, HOUSE BILL 332 (April 22, 1987). These
analysts concluded that the Illinois statute would likely be preempted by federal law except in two
circumstances: when a private firm becomes the employer of a bargaining unit formerly employed
by a governmental body, or when a bargaining unit is transferred from the control of one govern-
mental body to another.
109. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
110. Congress has not exercised its authority to occupy the field of labor legislation to the total
exclusion of the states. The Supreme Court has stated "[w]e cannot declare preempted all local
regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees,
employers, and unions; obviously, much of this is left to the States." Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 289 (1971).
111. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978).
112. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
113. Id. at 243-44.
114. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Congress granted this
jurisdiction in § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
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1. NLRB Jurisdiction
Congress created the NLRB and vested it with authority to interpret
and administer the provisions of the Act. Through the Board, Congress
sought to achieve uniformity in the substantive law governing labor rela-
tions and uniformity in national labor policy. 15 Therefore, the NLRA
preempts state regulation that impinges on the Board's authority and ju-
risdiction. In Garmon,1 16 the Supreme Court delineated the Board's ju-
risdiction. The Court stated that "when an activity is arguably subject to
section 7 or section 8 of the Act, the states as well as the federal courts
must defer to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board if the danger of state interference with national labor policy is to
be averted."' 17 The federal courts have provided additional focus to the
general Garmon inquiry. The NLRB's primary jurisdiction will preempt
a state law or state cause of action if the litigant's state law cause of
action is identical to that which the litigant could present to the NLRB-
if the predicate issues and the remedies in the two forums are substan-
tially the same. 18
115. See San Diego Bld'g. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1959). The Court
stated that in order to achieve the desired uniformity, it was crucial that Congress entrust the inter-
pretation and enforcement of the NLRA to a "centralized administrative agency, armed with its own
procedures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative experience." Id. at 242.
See also Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 445, 490-91 (1953) (expressing concern that differ-
ing judicial policies would result in conflicting interpretations of the NLRA).
116. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
117. Id. at 245. Section 7 of the Act grants employees the right to organize and join labor
organizations, to bargain collectively, and to engage in other concerted activities. 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1982). Section 8 lists activities which constitute unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982). For
example, an employer can not interfere with employee rights guaranteed under § 7, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1), or refuse to bargain with employee representatives, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). A labor or-
ganization cannot refuse to bargain with the employer if it is the representative of those employees,
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3), or picket or threaten to picket under certain circumstances, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(7). See also Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1968) (Garmon
prohibits states from regulating activity that the NLRA protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or
prohibits).
118. See Belknap Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 510 (1983). In Belknap, the Supreme Court held
that a state law tort action alleging that the employer misrepresented facts to replacement workers
was not preempted by the NLRA. Id. The Court determined the state cause of action was not
sufficiently similar to an action that the parties would bring before the Board. Id. See Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. San Diego County, 436 U.S. 180 (1978). In Sears the plaintiff brought a state law
trespass action against union picketers. Although the picketing itself was arguably protected by § 7
or arguably prohibited by § 8, the state law cause of action was not preempted. The litigant's state
action for trespass would address issues such as the location of the picketing, whereas a Board action
would address the object of the picketing. See also Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law
Preemption, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 277, 291 (1980) (Sears creates less predictability through its possible
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The Illinois statute provides that a successor clause in a collective bar-
gaining agreement can bind a successor to accept the terms of the agree-
ment."19 If the union brought an action in Illinois state court to enforce
this statute, the state court could compel the successor to accept the
terms of the unexpired collective bargaining agreement. However, in an
NLRB proceeding the question would be the successor's duty to bar-
gain.' 20 In Burns, the Court stated that the Board had the power to
require a successor to recognize and bargain with the union but could not
enforce the substantive terms of the existing agreement against the
successor. 121
The courts recognize two exceptions to the NLRB's primary jurisdic-
tion. If the state regulates a matter that is "merely a peripheral concern"
of the NLRA, the state statute will survive preemption analysis.' 22 This
exception stems from the view that if a matter is peripheral to the
NLRA, then the need for uniformity and centralized decision-making is
less.' 23 Therefore, conflict between the state statute and national labor
policy is unlikely. 124 However, the courts have construed this exception
narrowly.' 21 Even a broad construction provides no harbor for the Illi-
nois successor clause statute. The parties' obligations under a collective
bargaining is hardly a peripheral concern of the NLRA. Congress en-
acted the NLRA to promote the process of collective bargaining and
narrowing of federal labor preemption); Note, NLRA Preemption of State and Local Plant Reloca-
tion Laws, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 407, 416 n.78 (1986).
119. See supra note 101.
120. The union could bring an unfair labor practice claim pursuant to § 8 of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 158 (1982). See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
121. NLRB v. Bums Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972). See infra notes 20-24 and
accompanying text.
122. San Diego BId'g Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959).
123. Id. See also Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953) (expressing need
for uniformity under the federal labor laws).
124. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 137-38 (1976).
125. See New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Labor Dept., 440 U.S. 519 (1979) (New York
program providing unemployment compensation to striking workers not preempted because not in-
tended to regulate labor relations); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53
(1966) (peripheral concern excepting applied because claim limited to matter historically of deep
local concern); Massachusetts Nursing Ass'n v. Dukakis, 726 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1984) (hospital cost
containment legislation not preempted; court also relied on local interest exception); Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Whaland, 119 N.H. 894, 410 A.2d 635 (1979) (state law governing group
accident and health insurance policies of peripheral concern to NLRA even though medical benefits
are mandatory subject of bargaining). See also Note, supra note 118 at 417 n.82.
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thereby reduce industrial strife.126
The second exception exists where the regulated activity concerns in-
terests "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility." '127 The states
retain these powers because of the lack of compelling congressional direc-
tion in the NLRA evincing an intent to deprive the states of these pow-
ers. 2 Although the states have a public interest in protecting employees
from job loss, courts construe this exception narrowly and almost exclu-
sively apply it in the area of common law torts. 129
2. Balance of Power
The NLRA establishes a balance of power between labor and manage-
ment. Section 7 of the Act guarantees some economic power to employ-
ees through the protection of certain activities. 3 ' Section 8 proscribes
other activities by employers and employees as unfair labor practices. 131
Congressional silence as to other activities reflects an intent that some
aspects of the labor-management relationship be left to the "free play of
economic forces."' 32 Therefore, the NLRA preempts state law that dis-
turbs the economic balance of power by regulating conduct that Con-
gress sought to leave unregulated.
133
126. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). See supra note 8. The Illinois statute represents the
state's "views concerning the accommodation of the same interests" addressed by the NLRA and is
therefore preempted. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. at 140 n.4.
127. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.
128. Id.
129. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (state
cause of action allowed in trespass); Farmer v. United Bd. of Carpenters 430 U.S. 290, 297 (1977)
(allowed state cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against union); Linn v.
United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1956) (state cause of action for malicious
libel); Serrano v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 790 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir. 1986) (states interest in pro-
tecting citizens from misrepresentation overridden by need to enforce uniform labor law); Note,
supra note 118, at 416-17. But see Massachusetts Nursing Ass'n v. Dukakis 726 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir.
1984) (seemed to extend local interest exception to hospital cost containment legislation, although
may have also relied on peripheral concern exception).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). For examples of protected activities see supra note 117.
131. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982). For examples of unfair labor practices see supra note 117.
132. Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976) (quot-
ing NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)). See Belknap v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 499
(1983) (This preemption doctrine "proscribes state regulation and state-law causes of action con-
cerning . . . conduct that was to remain a part of the self-help remedies left to the combatants in
labor disputes."); Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337, 1352 (1972) (Con-
gress intended some aspects of the labor-management relationship to be left to economic forces, free
from local or federal regulation).
133. See Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964) (Even if the regulated conduct is not
prohibited or protected by NLRA, state law will be preempted if its application would upset the
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The Illinois statute regulates in an area Congress sought to leave un-
regulated. The NLRA does not address successor liability'34 and the
policies embodied in the Act compel the conclusion that this was not a
mere congressional oversight. The Act emphasizes the freedom of the
parties to bargain over employment terms. 135 The Act expressly states
that the duty to bargain does not compel either party to concede contract
terms.1 36 The terms themselves are left to the relative bargaining powers
of the parties. The Illinois statute, in effect, forces a successor to concede
to the terms of a contract that he has neither negotiated nor signed.
Therefore, the statute upsets the balance of power contemplated by the
Act.
In addition, the Illinois statute interferes with the relative bargaining
powers of the predecessor employer and the union. By providing a blan-
ket requirement that an employer must condition a sale of his business
because of the mere existence of a successor clause, the Illinois legislature
has foreclosed any bargaining over the content of the clause. 137 The em-
ployer must either agree to condition the sale of his business or make
what may be larger than normal concessions in other areas to avoid the
inclusion of a successor clause.
3. Section 301 Preemption
A third preemption analysis centers on section 301's authorization of
direct suits in federal district court for violations of collective bargaining
agreements.' 38  The courts have interpreted this statute to authorize-
even mandate-the creation of a federal common law governing the in-
terpretation and enforcement of federal labor contracts."' Section 301
balance of power between labor and management.). The Supreme Court has applied the peripheral
concern exception to economic balance of power preemption arguments. Brown v. Hotel & Restau-
rant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1984). The Court also
indicated that the local interest exception does not apply. Id.
134. See Slicker, supra note 11, at 1053 n.3.
135. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
136. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). See supra note 23.
137. A successor clause is a mandatory subject of bargaining. See supra notes 42-58 and accom-
panying text.
138. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act states "[s]uits for violation of con-
tracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties .... 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
139. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 488, 456 (1957), discussed supra note
12. Under § 301 state courts have concurrent jurisdiction but must apply federal law.
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preempts state laws that "purport to define the meaning or scope of a
term" in a collective bargaining agreement."4 It also preempts state
causes of action when they are "substantially dependent upon analysis of
the terms" of a collective bargaining agreement. 141
Section 301 does not preempt all state laws concerning employment or
collective bargaining agreements. A state law may establish rights or ob-
ligations that are independent of the labor contract but are related to it in
some way.1 42 Courts inquire whether the agreement of the parties can
alter the effect of the state statute. If the parties can, by agreement, con-
tract away the protections of the state statute, the courts will find the
statute not sufficiently independent of the contract and therefore
preempted. 143
The Illinois statute purports to define the meaning of a successor
clause and it fails to determine if the predecessor's duties are subject to
arbitration. Therefore, the statute fails under section 301 preemption
analysis. If the dispute is arbitratable, the federal courts, through their
preference for peaceful dispute resolution through the arbitration pro-
cess, 144 provide an avenue for determining both the union's and em-
ployer's intent when they included the successor clause in their labor
contract. 145 The Illinois statute instead provides that the employer must
condition the sale on the existence of a successor clause, regardless of
what the parties intended.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although under the above analysis the Illinois statute is preempted by
federal law, it raises the opportunity to question federal labor policies as
they apply to the enforcement of successor clauses. If a change in those
labor policies is to come, however, it must come from Congress. The
140. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985). In Allis Chalmers, § 301 pre-
empted a Wisconsin tort statute that provided employees a cause of action against their employer for
the employer's bad faith in processing an insurance claim. To determine if the employer acted in bad
faith, the court had to determine the scope of the employer's duties, which were defined in the
collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 216-19.
141. I.B.E.W. v. Hechler, 107 S.Ct. 2161 n.3 (1987). In Hechler the Court held that § 301 pre-
empted an employee's common law negligence action against the union because the union's duty of
care, in this context, was defined in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 2167-68.
142. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 212.
143. Id. at 213.
144. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 68-80 and accompanying text.
19891
Washington University Open Scholarship
600 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
policy of employee protection embodied in the Illinois statute is admira-
ble, but the blanket enforcement of successor clauses against successors
may be an unwise procedure to effectuate that policy. The statute pro-
vides governmental intervention at the expense of private negotiation and
determination of employment terms, and it provides certainty in succes-
sorship obligations at the expense of an ability to balance all of the inter-
ests involved.
Employees are not without protections under the current policies. In
the successorship area where economic interests, such as entreprenurial
flexibility, are at stake, the courts provide some employee protections
while relying on the market to provide others. More importantly, in the
predecessor context, unions can protect the employees they represent
through the existing policy of private determination of employment
terms. Because successor clauses are a mandatory subject of bargaining,
unions can require that an employer bargain over a successorship provi-
sion and the parties can determine for themselves the extent of their re-
spective obligations. Once the parties have defined their obligations, they
should be held to them. The union can bargain for specific successor
language in the labor contract-language that expressly requires the em-
ployer to condition a sale or transfer of the business on the buyer's as-
sumption of the collective bargaining agreement. Such language would
be binding and enforceable against the predecessor employer.
The Illinois statute unnecessarily interferes with the parties' ability to
define their obligations because it statutorily defines the parties' intent.
Conversely, current application of national labor policy to the successor-
ship area provides a fact-based definition of successor and predecessor
obligations and effectively balances the interests of the parties involved.
If employees want more protection from a sale or transfer of the business,
they must bargain for it or seek congressional change of current labor
policy.
Wendy C. Skjerven
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